Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy（ISBN=9780521671422） 最新 lit 百度云 下载 azw3 rb pdf kindle

　　This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and

consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer

different political institutions because of the way they allocate

political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the

majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship

nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social

disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression

are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible,

elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites

credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social

stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong

incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the

strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political

institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4)

the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy,

and (6) the form and extent of globalization.

Part I. Questions and Answers

Section 1. Paths of Political Development: 1. Britain

2. Argentina

3. Singapore

4. South Africa, 5. The agenda

Section 2. Our Argument: 1. Democracy vs. nondemocracy

2. Building blocks of our approach

3. Towards our basic story

4. Our theory of democratization

5. Democratic consolidation

6. Determinants of democracy

7. Political identities and the nature of conflict

8. Democracy in a picture

9. Overview of the book

Section 3. What Do We Know About Democracy?: 1. Measuring

democracy

2. Patterns of democracy

3. Democracy, inequality and redistribution

4. Crises and democracy

5. Social unrest and democratization

6. The literature

7. Our contribution

Part II. Modelling Politics

Section 4. Democratic Politics: 1. Introduction

2. Aggregating individual preferences

3. Single-peaked preferences and the median voter theorem

4. Our workhorse models

5. Democracy and political equality

6. Conclusion

Section 5. Nondemocratic Politics: 1. Introduction

2. Power and constraints in nondemocratic politics

3. Modeling preferences and constraints in nondemocracies

4. Commitment problems

5. A simple game of promises

6. A dynamic model

7. Incentive compatible promises

8. Conclusion

Part III. The Creation and Consolidation of Democracy

Section 6. Democratization: 1. Introduction

2. The role of political institutions

3. Preferences over political institutions

4. Political power and institutions

5. A 'static' model of democratization

6. Democratization or repression?

7. A dynamic model of democratization

8. Subgame perfect equilibria

9. Alternative political identities

10. Targeted transfers

11. Power of the elite in democracy

12. Ideological preferences over regimes

13. Democratization in pictures

14. Equilibrium revolutions

15. Conclusion

Section 7. Coups and Consolidation: 1. Introduction

2. Incentives for coups

3. A static model of coups

4. A dynamic model of the creation and consolidation of

democracy

5. Alternative political identities

6. Targeted transfers

7. Power in democracy and coups

8. Consolidation in a picture

9. Defensive coups

10. Conclusion

Part IV. Putting the Models to Work

Section 8. The Role of the Middle Class: 1. Introduction

2. The three-class model

3. Emergence of partial democracy

4. From partial to full democracy

5. Repression: the middle class as a buffer

6. Repression: soft-liners vs. hard-liners

7. The role of the middle class in consolidating democracy

8. Conclusion

Section 9. Economic Structure and Democracy: 1. Introduction

2. Economic structure and income distribution

3. Political conflict

4. Capital, land and the transition to democracy

5. Financial integration

6. Increased political integration

7. Alternative assumptions about the nature of international trade.

8. Conclusion

Part V. Conclusion and The Future of Democracy

Section 10. Conclusion and the Future of Democracy: 1. Paths of

political development revisited

2. Extension and areas for future research

3. The future of democracy

Part VI. Appendix

Section 11. Appendix to Section 4: The Distribution of Power in

Democracy: 1. Introduction

2. Probabilistic voting models

3. Lobbying

4. Partisan politics and political capture.

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